#### NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

To the Matter of:

"FIRE ON BOARD M/V COLUMBIA"

DOCKET NO. DCA-00-MM030

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#### INTERVIEW OF:

STANLEY R. JONES
Day-Worker
6:00 a.m. - 6:00 p.m.)
Third Assistant Engineer
M/V COLUMBIA

#### Interview Taken by:

Mike Jones
NTSB Human Factors Group Chairman

MR. Tom Roth-Roffy NTSB Engineering Factors Group Chairman

Terry Weaver NTSB Survival Factors Group Chairman

1	PROCEEDINGS
2	MR. MIKE JONES: The time is 11:42, Saturday,
3	June 10th. And we are with Stanley Jones, the 3 A
4	engineer.
5	And Mr. STANLEY R. JONES, would you give us
6	your date of birth, please?
7	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: Two, twenty-three,
8	forty-seven.
9	MR. MIKE JONES: And what licenses do you
10	hold?
11	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: I hold an unlimited
12	third assistant engineer's license from the United
13	States Coast Guard.
14	MR. MIKE JONES: How long have you been in the
15	marine industry?
16	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: Including Navy,
17	probably 15 years.
18	MR. MIKE JONES: Okay. How long were you in
19	the Navy?
20	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: I was in the Navy three
21	years, nine months, 20 days.
22	MR. MIKE JONES: To the day.
23	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: Pretty close.
24	MR. MIKE JONES: All right. And when did you
25	join Alaska Marine Highway System?

1	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: I came to work for
2	Alaska Marine Highway in 1990, 6/30/90.
3 .	MR. MIKE JONES: And prior to that?
4	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: I was in construction.
5	I was an equipment operator and a construction
6	superintendent, foreman, and dealt a little bit with
7	barges and off loading equipment, sea/land equipment
8	type <u>of</u> stuff.
9	MR. MIKE JONES: Okay. How long did you do
10	that?
11	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: Uh, forever. Off and
12	on for 15 years.
13	MR. MIKE JONES: For 15 years. Is that after
14	you got out of the Navy?
15	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: After I got out of the
16	Navy, I was a police officer.
17	MR. MIKE JONES: Police officer, okay.
18	And for whom were you a police officer?
19	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: I was a police officer
20	for the City of Sweethome, Oregon, and I was a police
21	officer for the City of Sheridan, Oregon. Don't go
22	there, Doug.
23	MR. MIKE JONES: In And Sheritondan?
24	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: Sheridan.
25	MR. MIKE JONES: Sheridan.

1	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: S-H-E-R-I-D-A-N.
2	MR. MIKE JONES: D-A-N. Okay.
3	And does that about do it for your resume,
4	career?
5	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: Yeah, give or take, you
6	know, a lot of nickel, dime stuff.
7	MR. MIKE JONES: Okay When did you first
8	join the, $now_{7}$ we have when you joined the Alaska
9	Marine, when did you first join this vessel, the
10	Columbia?
11	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: That has been off and
12	on since I have been here.
13	MR. MIKE JONES: Okay.
14	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: I got a permanent
15	position this year. And I was, I held this position
16	the last year all year, from, the dates escape me, but
17	probably around June, July of last year.
18	MR. MIKE JONES: Okay.
19	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: And when I did the yard
20	period, through the yard period,
21	MR. MIKE JONES: Have you worked any other via
22	the Alaska Marine vessels?
23	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: Oh, yeah.
24	MR. MIKE JONES: Okay.
25	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: The Taku, the

1	Malaspina, the Tustumena, the Bartlett. And that
2	should be
3	MR. MIKE JONES: Okay. Okay. All right.
4	Now, for this particular trip, the trip that the fire
5	occurred on, when did you join, when did you come
6	aboard?
7	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: Sunday the fourth in
8	Ketchikan.
9	MR. MIKE JONES: Sunday the fourth.
10	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: At about eight a.m.
11	MR. MIKE JONES: Okay And were you coming
12	from another job thenre or coming from home or,
13	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: No, I was coming from
14	home.
15	MR. MIKE JONES: From home.
16	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: And you flew in down
17	from <u>Juneua</u>
18	MR. MIKE JONES: And you flew in from
19	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: Juneau.
20	MR. MIKE JONES: Juneau. Okay.
21	Can you give me idea about generally what
22	your activities were home time, up until, up until the
23	time you came aboard the ship?
24	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: What I was doing?
25	MR. MIKE JONES: Yeah, just general, primary

1	stuff.
2	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: (inaudible)
3	MR. MIKE JONES: Anything that would be
4	particularly taxing, you know, big work load, cutting a
5	lot of grass.
6	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: (inaudible) that was
7	about it.
8	MR. MIKE JONES: OkayHow long had you been
9	off?
10	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: Let's see, that is kind
11	of weird, because a good two, a good week and a half.
12	MR. MIKE JONES: Okay.
13	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: But, I am trying to
14	place, I did an assignment somewhere.
15	(Pause.)
16	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: Oh, I came off the yard
17	period.
18	MR. MIKE JONES: Okay. Off the yard period.
19	And so, you were home about a week and a half.
20	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: Yes.
21	MR. MIKE JONES: Is that right?
22	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: Yes.
23	MR. MIKE JONES: Okay. What is your, you
24	know, I am asking a lot of weird questions.
25	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: That is all right.

1,	MR. MIKE JONES: That is what I do.
2	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: Ask whatever you want
3	to ask.
4	MR. MIKE JONES: I ask weird stuff.
5	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: It doesn't matter to
6	me.
7	MR. MIKE JONES: But, what sort of sleep
8	habits do you have when you are at home? Do you sleep
9	a straight eight?
10	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: (inaudible)
11	MR. MIKE JONES: Okay. Okay.
12	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: I have normal sleep
13	habits. I try to get at least eight, nine hours of
14	sleep a day.
15	MR. MIKE JONES: Okay. Do you, in fact, get
16	that?
17	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: Oh, yeah, if I am tired
18	I take a nap.
19	MR. MIKE JONES: Okay OkayWell, that
20	brings us up to the day you joined on the vessel, on
21	the fourth. Run me on up and give me an idea of what
22	your activities were once you came onboard.
23	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: Once I came onboard, I
24	checked in with the pursuer there, the normal routine.
25	The check in took a little longer this time. They had

1	some extra, different paperwork to do and I had to do
2	some running up and down to the chief and get that
3	signed. And then I just went about my normal business.
4	Checked in, unpacked, got a briefing from my relief,
5	spent probably an hour with him, finding out what took
6	place the previous week and that was the week, that is,
7	okay, that is it. That was the week my relief, who
8	was, my opposite, who was Tim Park, he was a relief out
9	of the hall, a lot of things had taken place that week,
10	you know, plug toilets, plug this, you know, the normal
11	stuff after you get out of the yard.
12	MR. MIKE JONES: Okay. So a lot of work.
13	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: There was a mMajor work
L4	load, for their week, and they had solved quite a bit
L5	of the problems, and he was just relaying to me what
16	problems weren't taken care of, such as, I remember one
17	distinctly, room 140, the air conditioning and the
18	heating system was still messed up and needed to be
L9	worked on, and general stuff like that.
20	MR. MIKE JONES: Okay. Was there still a
21	whole lot of stuff that had to be done?
22	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: Well, when you come out
23	of the shipyard like that, and the problem with these
24	vessels, with the State of Alaska is that they lay this
25	ship up for six months at a time, and then they don't

give us the manpower to take care of the hotel. 1 2 they call us and say you are going to gear up and be ready in a week. 3 4 MR. MIKE JONES: Okay. MR. STANLEY R. JONES: And then you have got 5 35, 45 miles of sewage lines, salt water lines, they 6 are just laying there for the whole six months with no, 7 no work done to them, and then it is up to us to get it 8 9 running in a week. MR. MIKE JONES: Now, you are a day worker, is 10 11 that correct? MR. STANLEY R. JONES: Yes. 12 13 MR. MIKE JONES: So, now I am not a mariner, 14 so you will have to help me out a little bit on it. 15 MR. STANLEY R. JONES: Sure. MR. MIKE JONES: Does that mean you are 16 17 working this 12 hour shift? 18 MR. STANLEY R. JONES: I work a six to six at 19 night. MR. MIKE JONES: You work six and six. 20 MR. STANLEY R. JONES: Six on, no, six a.m. to 21 I don't work a six to six. 22 six p.m. 23 MR. MIKE JONES: Six a.m. to six p.m. MR. STANLEY R. JONES: Right. 24

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MR. MIKE JONES: So, that is 12 hours.

25

1	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: Yes.
2	MR. MIKE JONES: Okay. And so, you worked
3	thata 12 hour shift and then how long are you off?
4	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: Twelve.
5	MR. MIKE JONES: Off another 12.
6	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: That depends on whether
7	or not we have a green or a new engineer on watch.
8	MR. MIKE JONES: Okay.
9	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: I could at times be
10	asked to stand watch to break in an engineer at the
11	control panel.
12	MR. MIKE JONES: Okay. Did anything like
13	that happen this time?
14	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: No, no, no. But, I was
15	gearing up for it because we were bringing, this week
16	we would have been bringing out a new engineer and
17	later on this week, I would have went to a six and six.
18	MR. MIKE JONES: Okay.
19	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: Just to break in.
20	MR. MIKE JONES: All right. Does that kind of
21	thing happen frequently?
22	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: With this ship, yeah.
23	MR. MIKE JONES: Yeah.
24	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: Because we, we are real
25	low on, we don't have a, our personnel staff isn't up

1	to snuff right now junior engineers, oilers and
2	thirds operating - come out we're running a little
3	short.
4	MR. MIKE JONES: Now, when you are working a
5	12 and 12 like that, what is your sleeping like? How
6	many hours
7	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: I get off, I go have
8	dinner about 6:30, seven, and then $I'_{\underline{m}}$ have kicked
9	tipped over by nine. Get up about five.
10,	MR. MIKE JONES: Nine to five, so a good eight
11	hours.
12	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: Four Or, I try to get
13	four, four-thirty, five, and have a cup of coffee, mess
14	around and then start the day.
15	MR. MIKE JONES: Now, when you are onboard
16	ship, how many hours of sleep would you say is normal
17	for you?
18	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: For me? Oh, a minimum
19	of eight.
20	MR. MIKE JONES: Minimum of eight, okay. And,
21	in fact, were you able to get the eight the day before
22	the fire this time?
23	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: No.
24	MR. MIKE JONES: What did you get?
25	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: Let's see, 10 o'clock

1	we worked on the bridge wing. The Bridge called up,
2	they had problems with the light on the indicator on
3	the starboard wing, so we went up and we changed the
4	light and we checked on their bow thruster toggle
5	switch. And when we took it apart, there is a
6	connection in there that didn't function correctly
7	when and we put it back together, when the Captain went
8	to park the boat, he didn't have use of the bow
9	thruster, so, myself, the first engineer and the chief
10	engineer finished working the light, and then we
11	continued working on it, until we got it repaired. And
12	then there was some other things that took place that
13	night. We had a plugged drain in the gallery. We had
14	heating system down in 140 messing up. A couple of
15	other little items, nick-nacks that we just went ahead
16	and took care of. So, I got off about 10, got in bed
17	about 11, got back up about four, four thirty a.m
18	MR. MIKE JONES: Okay. Okay. And then you
19	were awake until the fire.
20	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: Yes.
21	MR. MIKE JONES: Okay. And I know they have
22	other questions for you concerning what happened with
23	the fire, and that kind of thing, so, I will cut off at
24	this pointI may come back and ask you some other
25	questions

1	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: Sure.
2	CAPTAIN M/V COLUMBIA: I was asked by Captain
3	Capacci to bring you this name and phone number and
4	another business down in the Seattle area, for a
5	possible electrical expert. They got a name of a guy
6	electric in Seattle. And he wouldn't be able to travel
7	up here. He is available by phone and there is another
. 8	firm here that may have somebody for us.
9	MR. TOM ROTH-ROFFY: Very good. Thank you.
10	Who gave you this?
11	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: Captain Capacci.
12	MR. TOM ROTH-ROFFY: Thank you very much.
13	Okay. Thanks.
14	MR. MIKE JONES: Tom, or Terry?
15	MR. TOM ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. I will go ahead
16	ask a couple of questions.
17	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: Sure.
18	MR. TOM ROTH-ROFFY: What I would like you to
19	do, Stan, if you can, is start from the time you went
20	lunch, which was about what time?
21	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: Let's see, finished up
22	in the basement, we had just picked up, there was a
23	lot, still some stuff around from the shipyard that we
24	were picking up and I was kind of cleaning up from, so,
25	probably about 10 to 12.

1	MR. TOM ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. If you would
2	start from the time you started your lunch and then
3	from that point on if you would describe everything
4	that happened, the sequence of events, if you can put
5	in some times.
6	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: Sure.
7	MR. TOM ROTH-ROFFY: Or how many minutes
8	transpired from one event to the next, if possible. I
9	mean, I know in the heat of an event, it is kind of
10	hard to remember, but if you do recall any of that.
11	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: Ordered lunch.
12	MR. TOM ROTH-ROFFY: Let me, just a little
13	more. Tell me everything that you saw, people that
14	told you stuff, what you told other people, what you
15	heard, what you saw, smelled, you know, basically just
16	try to visualize, if you would, from the time you are,
17	saying sitting at lunch, and then what happeneds.
18	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: Okay. Just went into
19	lunch about 10 to 12. Ordered lunch, and the chief
20	engineer, myself, the first, the off-watch or I think
21	Webster, Webster, was in there and Pat Wickets. And we
22	were just general BS-ing and at 12:10 it all went to
23	heck — in a hand carry. The reason I know it was
24	12:10 is because I had just ordered lunch and she was
25	taking a little bit, because I wanted to get up to my

1	room, get my life jacket because we had a fire and boat
2	drill. And in ah, turned I looked at the clock, and
3	that is when the lights flickered and I said, that is
4	god damn ugly. And myself and the Chief and the First,
5	all got up about the same time. The Chief was ahead of
6	me, the First was behind me. At that point the three
7	of us were kind of letting each other know where we
8	were going. The First yelled, I am going to the
9	emergency generator room. I think the Chief said, I
10	heard the generator start, and I confirmed that I heard
11	it start. And I kind of, I think I said I am going to
12	the control room. And the Chief and I headed down the
13	port passageway, got to the 200 deck, the Chief
14	continued on down the passenger stairwell. I turned
15	and went down the crew quarters, the crew stairwell,
16	which accesses closer to the engine room.
17	And let's see. Scrambled my way to the
18	engine room hatch, now I don't think I touched the
19	stair going down in the engine room and I ran to the
20	control booth, and at that point I saw Lee Chapman, our
21	oiler, and Lee, Lee yelled at me, he said, "Don't open
22	the door, the control panel is gone." And I turned, I
23	was looking as he was telling me this.
24	MR. TOM ROTH-ROFFY: Let me just this
25	equipment.

1	(Pause.)
2	MR. TOM ROTH-ROFFY: Sorry.
3	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: I was looking as he was
4	telling me this and I could see that the window was
5	black, and the top eight, nine, ten inches of the door
6 -	frame was blowing billowing out thick, dark, black
7	smoke. I turned to Lee and I said, is everybody out of
8	the booth? And out of the corner of my eye, caught the
9	third engineer on watch, Dan Rhodes in the auxiliary
10	room. And Lee said, yes, everybody is out. And I
11	said, okay. And I said, get out of here. I am not
12	sure exactly what I said at that point. I knew we had
13	a hell of a problem. And the thought in my mind was I
14	need to initiate a fire alarm, I need to initiate some
15	communications to the bridge. And I kind of did a
16	little spin and then I, as I was leaving the engine
17	room, I realized, number one, we don't have a fire
18	pull, we don't have access to a general alarm, and we
19	don't have access to a fire alarm. We have access to
20	no phone outside of that booth. So, my world was
21	crashing around me at that point, so I continued on up
22	and I am thinking, okay, I have got an option, I have
23	got the Co2, but, at that point it wasn't really an
24	option, but it was cropping my mind.
25	I ran from the booth, exited the engine room,

ran directly to the starboard corridor which was the 1 2 closest sound--powered phone at this point adrenaline had taken over, with a couple of packs of cigarettes 3 and I am dialing the bridge, and I yelled at the 5 bridge, I said, this is not a drill, this is a fire. There is a fire in the engine room, the control room is 6 7 engulfed. Sound the fire drill, fire alarm. 8 think I continued on with muster the east E squad 9 starboard hatch to the engine room. 10 At that point I turned and I noticed my chief engineer, who kind of hand signaled me, you know, I 11 12 don't know how to explain it, but it was an eye 13 contact, hand signal, he was in this, hand signal, eye 14 contact communication and he was asking me what did, 15

don't know how to explain it, but it was an eye contact, hand signal, he was in this, hand signal, eye contact communication and he was asking me what did, did I get the bridge, and I acknowledged I got the bridge. I turned, I ran back, I came in contact with Tom Cook, and I said, I told Tom, I said, let's get to the emergency gear locker, let's get an OBA and let's get moving. And at that point I got to the gear locker, and the gear locker was locked. So, I turned quickly, thinking, okay, where is the key, where is the key, and I am thinking, okay, I am going to beat this lock off if I have to and then it dawned on me where the key was. And at that point I had pretty much the engine room staff with me. I had Lee Chapman, Dan

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Rhodes, and Tom Cook. And I am yelling at them, it is just inside the door in a break in glass. So, they accessed the key, got the key, got the OBA out. I donned the OBA, by this time the chief engineer is back And he him and I had a short discussion, real short and we both came come to the conclusion that we needed to make sure that the bus tie to the emergency generator was open. And I just said, let's go, and so, at that point him and I went down into the engine room. And I think I turned and said something to somebody, I said, keep everybody out of the space until you hear I am not sure if I said that, but that from me. thought was in there.

The Chief and I went down in the engine room. And I had a flashlight and I am not sure if I had the, our big red one or a small regular flashlight. And I felt the door, I didn't get much of a heat sense, and I dropped down on one knee and I said, okay, what do we need, Chief, and he said, he told me, he said, we need that bus tie secured to make sure it is secured. Make sure that bus tie is open. I said, okay, I am going. The Chief opened the door, and apparently it was real dark in there. So, I dropped down as close as I could get to the deck, and I knew exactly where the bus tie was, I wasn't, I didn't feel any danger or any

1 problems with for myself, I was just worried about 2 getting the ship in a safe and secure mode. 3 crawled 15 feet into the booth and I am running into the chair and I know pretty much I am close to where 5 the engineer sits, I am kind of judging where my bus tie is. And I turn the flashlight to my face mask and 7 I couldn't see the light, so I said, oh, boy, you are 8 in deep trouble. So, I said, let's get out of here, to 9 myself, backed out, and I told the Chief, I said, I 10 need a life line so I can get my butt out. 11 The Chief said, okay. He slammed the door shut and let's go. The Chief has got a rag over his 12 face. He can't hardly breathe. We exited the engine 13 14 room on the starboard hatch, and that is when my first 15 assistant engineer showed up, Glen Scott. Or he was 16 already there. He may have even been down into the 17 engine room at that point. He may have done a little 18 Constellation confab right there. More than likely he 19 did. We exited the engine room. Glen donned an OBA. 20 We got a life line and we went back down in. Myself, 21 Glen Scott, Chief Engineer. And again, we all 22 confirmed that we needed to make sure the bus tie to 23 the emergency generator was open. I had the lead on 24 the life line, so I went first, and Glen was behind me, 25 the Chief held the door open, I dropped down on my

1	hands and knees and my elbows, and crawled head long
2	straight into the booth. At that point I am just
3	nervous because this could get away from us. And I
4	said, we are in deep shit.
5	And as I was passing the breaker panels, I
6	could hear them crackling and popping and I am not sure
7	if it was arcing, I can't put a finger on that. I
8	can't put a finger on any flash of electrical light.
9	And I am close to the, I know I am close to the breaker
10	panel and I am just moving forward and I have got the
11	chair on my left and I know where I am at, and I am
12	dropped down as far as I can get and I am trying to
13	shine the light on the panel, so I can get this
14	particular switch that I am trying to get to, is
15	encased or in, outlined in yellow and black tape. It
16	is an indicator tape and it has got a note on there, if
17	you are not smart enough to know what this button is,
18	don't touch it, and other things like that. And I find
19	it, so, I move forward and I reach to touch it and I
20	got about maybe three, four inches away from the panel,
21	and I got a blue arc to my hand, and I knocked my hand
22	back. And I turned to Glen and I yelled, I said, panel
23	is hot, don't touch it, the panel is hot. He crawled
24	over the top of me, and hit the breaker with the
25	flachlight thus opening the breaker. And I welled to

him, I said, let's go, and he turned to go and he
reached up and hit two more breakers. We moved further
towards the door, we know where we are at, he hit
another breaker and it exploded.

At this point we are, what is going through

At this point we are, what is going through my head is, we still have got power to that board and we shouldn't have power to that board. We got back outside. We shut the door. At this point it becomes technically foggy. We left the engine room. My pack, the alarm went off. We exited the engine room, tried to get some sense of order at the hatch, where we entered the engine room, and that was somewhat chaotic.

\_Got a new air bottle, and we decided to go back down with Co2. There was already a couple of extinguishers set out, down by the booth, I am not sure who put them out there. And then we just continued on.

We just decided that, I think we went back down into the engine room. I, assessed the situation again. Myself and Glen Scott started lining up the starboard engine. We were using onedidn't want a dead ship. The Chief was taking care of the generators. I know that the Chief and the First were talking back and forth about the generator and that they would go that way. And we were thinking fire pumps, and there were a couple of hundred things going through your head at the

1	timeThe one big one was, was we didn't want the ship
2	to do able not to make way. We didn't know exactly
3	where we were. And we were, because we didn't have any
4	communication with the bridge, us three, didn't. And
5	that is pretty much it.
6	We got the starboard engine lined up, we were
7	only lacking maybe one valve to get it finished lining
8	up, when the Chief decided to, he didn't want to go
9	ahead and line up the starboard engine, which was is
10	our emergency engine when we lose power. I think, I
11	don't know that.
12	MR. TOM ROTH-ROFFY: Go ahead. It is fine.
13	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: I am kind of rambling
14	at this point because there it is a little bit foggy.
15	MR. TOM ROTH-ROFFY: Please continue.
16	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: And it is a little bit
17	because this is where the chaos comes in, up to this
18	point everything is pretty much boob, boob, boob we
19	pretty much know we have got a problem. We pretty much
20	know how to handle it. But, it is a little chaotic at
21	the top of the hatch.
22	Questions at this point would be more than
23	welcome.
24	MR. TOM ROTH-ROFFY: What I have asked you to
25	do is try to just try this, try to visualize, if it

1	(would help to close your eyes, try to draw from your
2	memory, I mean, it is maybe a chaotic memory, if you
3	can, and just try to, try to recall what happened at
4	the top of the hatch, when you went down and just kind
5	of, as you are visualizing it, try to vocalize.
6	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: Well, the Chief is
7	giving directions. He is telling us what we need to
8	get done, what he wants done. We are also making input
9	as to, in case he oversees something, or misses and
10	this is something. — The fuel oil for the main
11	engine, the management, auxiliary engines, at this
12	point we have decided to eliminate the generator, the
13	main generator from the system. The fuel OIL shut off
14	valves are located on the car deck. Those were secured
15	to all operating pieces of equipment in the engine
16	room, boiler, all three generators, both engines, the
17	fuel-oil sepaerators, were secured from the car deck.
18	And then we were just in and out of the engine room and
19	then we secured three air bottles, because we wanted to
20	keep air on hand in case we needed to light off started
21	the starboard engine and deal and be able to operate it
22	remotely. <u>It was Aa</u> t that point there was just a lot
23	of running, you know, just taking care of a lot of
24	minor things that needed to be taken care of.
25	MR. MIKE JONES: At what point did the Coast

Guard arrive?

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MR. STANLEY R. JONES: You know, that is, that is a good question, I am not quite sure, sir. I would say the Coast Guard was there, they were in short They were standing by. Now, Glen and I and the Chief had made more than, we were several trips in and out of the engine room. At this point we had released the fire screen doors. At that point we all decided that, okay, we have got to box fire, we have got it contained. It is not going anywhere, as long as those doors aren't open, as long as the fire screen doors are closed, we have got a simple container fire, with no oxygen. We have got no fuel to it and we have got no electricity to it. We got no air to it. It is going to quiet down. At that point we had the Coast Guard somewhere in that area, the Coast Guard boys had And through the four of them, and the three arrived. of us, we decided we are going to go and make sure that this is what we have and what we had come to the conclusion that we do have. The Coast Guard entered the space, two men. We sprayed shot Co2 into the board through ventilation ducts. At In the bottom of the board there are air ventilation ducts, and we tried to access the Co2

through the ventilation system or the ventilation ducts

1	in the control panel. We removed some, the Chief threw
2	out some life preservers, it was four life preservers
3	stuck in the wall. And when I say stuck in the wall, I
4	don't mean stuck in the wall, I mean, they were in a
5	space between the wall and the control panel. And we
6	continued on at that point and we went through two,
7 .	three, four Co2 canisters, 20 pounds, maybe one 10
8	pounder, and a five pounder. At that point That is
9 ·	when we decided it is time to take the panels off and
LO	because we are still getting heat, the heat is still
11	being generated at this point, at least that is what we
12	thought. — So, we removed some of the panels, the two
L3	middle ones. Glen Scott ripped the breakers out of the
L4	panel, and come to find out the breakers were still
15	cooking. So, we threw a breaker outside, Co2ed it
L6	outside of the booth. And at that point we just
L7	started dissecting the fire, you know, let's get to the
L8	end, let's get to wherever it was still cooking. And
19	we accessed the 100 pound Co2, probably went through
20	half of that in the board.
21	Before we opened that panel, I will add this,
22	we shut, we secured the emergency generator. Because
23	we still didn't know whether or not we had heat to
24.	that, and when I say heat, I mean, electricity to that
25	bus. And at this point nobody was hurt, so, there was

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1	no reason to take any more chances. And we pretty
2	much, the situation was under control and in hand.
3	So, that is about where we are.
4	MR. TOM ROTH-ROFFY: After the first time you
5	made entry with the First Engineer, you went in and
6	kicked hit those breakers and you came back out, you
7	went up to the top of the outside, exited the engine
8	room and you said you got a new bottle.
9	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: Right.
10	MR. TOM ROTH-ROFFY: And then you went down in
11	the engine room.
12	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: Right.
13	MR. TOM ROTH-ROFFY: Did you reenter the
14	control room with that new bottle at that point or what
15	did you do after that?
16	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: Well, the space was, we
17	had no ventilation, so, the space, itself, the engine
18	room space, the auxiliary engine room, the auxiliary
19	engine room especially, was engulfed in a light gray
20	smoke. But, it was that burning insulation, wiring
21 .	insulation and it was pretty toxic. So, we just dawned
22	donned OBAs to secure the valves, line up the starboard
23	engine for making way and making sure we had air
24	bottles in-tact. At this point, at that point we were,
25	we had basically discounted the control room as an

1	entity of the vessel. We wanted to make sure that we
. 2	had the engine in-tact and a way to operate it.
3	MR. TOM ROTH-ROFFY: And while you were having
4	lunch and the lights started flickering, could you
5	describe that flickering, lights
6	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: It was a strange
7	flicker.
8	MR. TOM ROTH-ROFFY: And how long did that
9	persist, and when it ended? When do you recall the
10	flickering stopped and the lights either came on or
11	went off and stayed in that position condition?
12	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: Well, I think that is
13	the reason I made a comment about it is ugly. Because
14	normally if you lose power, the lights may flicker once
15	and go right back out. Because the emergency
16	generator, you can tell when the emergency generator
17	picks up the load. I don't know, it is hard to explain
18	because you have got to be there to see it. But, this
19	time, I looked at the overhead and the lights flickered
20	probably three to four times, bang, bang, bang. It was
21	indicating to me that something other than just a
22	normal loss of a load, you know, for whatever reason,
23	an engineer switched the generators and we didn't
24	parallel them correctly and it tripped out or whatever.
25	This just didn't seem normal to me. But, I could hear

1	as we were leaving the mess hall, I could hear the
2	emergency generator engine come on, but now whether or
3	not the auto synchronization switch picked it up, I
4	don't know. And that is when Glen hollered, I am going
5 ;	to the E room and he departed me and the Chief.
6	MR. TOM ROTH-ROFFY: Do you remember how long,
7 .	this light, was this three or four times and the lights
8	went out or was it for a period of several minutes?
9	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: Oh, seconds. This is
10	just a ——milliseconds, bang, bang, bang and then out,
11	and then at that point I am assuming the generators
12	come on. Because now I am navigating down the
13	passageway, so I am not really paying attention to the
14	lighting system. Flashlight in hand.
15	MR. TOM ROTH-ROFFY: You said that you had
16	trouble finding the key for the emergency gear locker.
17	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: Yes.
18	MR. TOM ROTH-ROFFY: Did you know where that
19	key was, obviously at the time you didn't, but had you
20	ever had ocasssion to
21	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: Yes, I know exactly
22	where that key is and I can take you to it now, and I
23	can take it you to any time. It was, I don't know,
24	something clicked in there and I went brain dead for a
25	second. And I got three guys yelling at me, it is

1	locked, it is locked, it is locked, so, I, my brain
2	went dead for a second. And I just started looking for
3	something, I am going to beat this door apart, one way
4	another, I am getting in there. And then it clicked
5	the key is in the, inside of the engine room doorway,
6	in a glass enclosed case.
7	MR. TOM ROTH-ROFFY: Now, you also said that
8	the emergency generator bus tie in, on the main switch
9	board, you decided or the Chief and you decided that
10	that needed to be opened.
11	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: Absolutely.
12	MR. TOM ROTH-ROFFY: And what, what led you to
13	believe that that was something you needed to do?
14	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: We wanted to make damn
15	sure that no electricity was being fed back from the
16	emergency generator to the main bus. At that point, we
17	didn't actually know what our situation was. We wanted
18	to eliminate any potential problems. And that, you
19	know, I am not saying that is the problem, but it is
20	just one elimination. In a situation like this, you
21	want to get rid of all the ugly ducklings, you know,
22	the one that is going to jump up and bite you.
23	MR. TOM ROTH-ROFFY: Do you recall seeing
24	either the, number one or number two ship service
25	diesel generator running?

1	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: No, I didn't, I didn't
2	enter into that area. The Chief was taking care of
3	that, along with, I believe Dan Rhodes and/or the
.4	First.
5	MR. TOM ROTH-ROFFY: Okay So, you don't,
6	you didn't see anything.
7	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: No. I didn't even go
8	that way. My main concern was the control room.
9	MR. TOM ROTH-ROFFY: So, you did not reenter
10	the control room until the Coast Guard fire fighters
11	arrived on scene.
12	(Pause.)
13	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: Its foggy I am
14	going to have to say no.
15	MR. TOM ROTH-ROFFY: Okay.
16	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: I think we, the three
17	of us, the Chief, myself, the First, I know we were
18	having a discussion right there at the booth, and the
19	Chief said that is okay, it is controlled, it is not
20	going anywhere. Leave the door shut, let it do its
21	thing. And then he was telling the First, we have got
22	both generators off line, and we are on the E circuit
23	and the breaker is open. Let's not go back in there.
24	I think it was the Chief's decision not to go back in
25	there. Which was OK with me.

1	MR. TOM ROTH-ROFFY: Now, when you went in
2	with the First behind you and you reached up to trip
3	that bus tie, you say your hand was a couple of inches
4	from the switch board.
5	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: Three, four.
6	MR. TOM ROTH-ROFFY: And did you see an arc?
7	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: Yes.
8	MR. TOM ROTH-ROFFY: And did you feel it?
9	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: I felt it.
10	MR. TOM ROTH-ROFFY: Did you have gloves on
11	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: No.
12	MR. MIKE JONES: You had your bare hands.
13	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: Stupid.
14	MR. TOM ROTH-ROFFY: OkayI am going to
15	stop now and let Terry ask a couple of questions now.
16	And I would like to go on and come back again.
17	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: Sure.
18	MS. TERRY WEAVER: I am Terry Weaver, the
19	Survival Factors Investigator. Basically And I just want
20	, and I am going to ask you a couple of questions
21	concerning the emergency procedures. I met you earlier
22	when we first got onboard.
23	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: Sure, sure.
24	MS. TERRY WEAVER: Have you ever had any
25	formal fire fighting training?

1	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: Yes.
2	MS. TERRY WEAVER: Can you explain what you
3	had?
4	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: I had normal fire
<b>5</b> .	fighting training with the United States Navy I have
6	also done fire fighting schools here inwith the State
7	of Alaska. I completed the Coast Guard requirement for
8	fire fighting, requirements for my license. And that
9	is pretty much it.
10	MS. TERRY WEAVER: Are you a member of the
11	fire fighting team on the Columbia?
12	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: Yeah, I am a member of
13	the emergency squad, which is, technically the fire
14	fighting team.
15	MS. TERRY WEAVER: If you know, about how many
16	people make up the emergency squad that is responsible
17	for fire fighting?
18	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: I don't should know
19	that Although our station bill was just rearranged,
20	because we just came out of the yard for a the new
21	SOLAS and ISM requirement. My station was actually
22	changed from what it was last year. Last year I was, I
23	was stationed in the emergency generator room during
24	the fire.
25	MS. TERRY WEAVER: So, you don't have an idea

1,	about how many make up the team? If you don't, that is
2	okay.
. 3	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: Ten, I don't know.
4	MS. TERRY WEAVER: Around.
5	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: I am not going to give
6	you a number guess, I don't know.
7	MS. TERRY WEAVER: Okay. So, you
8	participated in fire drills with the fire team?
9	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: Absolutely.
10	MS. TERRY WEAVER: Okay. Have you ever
11	simulated an electrical fire?
12	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: Oh, yeahWe do that a
13	lot.
14 .	MS. TERRY WEAVER: Okay. — Do Yyou simulated
15	to something similar to what happened?
16	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: No.
17	MS. TERRY WEAVER: In this case?
18	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: No. Generally, no. We
19	will simulate a grease or a gallery fire, an electrical
20	fire, an electrical fire say in a stateroom. I don't,
21	I don't recall ever being involved in a simulation
22	directly in the engine room per se.
23	MS. TERRY WEAVER: And how long have you been
24	on the Columbia?
25	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: Oh, I have been here

1	off and on for 10 years.
2	MS. TERRY WEAVER: About 10 years.
3	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: Off and on.
4	MS. TERRY WEAVER: Off and on.
5	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: This Different vessels,
6	you know, a couple of weeks here, this is has been my
7	permanent ship since the middle of last year.
8	MS. TERRY WEAVER: Okay. And since that time
9	you don't recall participating in a fire drill
10	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: No.
11	MS. TERRY WEAVER: Simulation?
12	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: The way you put that,
13	it sounds like we don't do fire drills. We do fire
14	drill every week. We do simulated electrical fires,
15	but per se to simulate a fire at that board, it is
16	almost, it is hard to do because the space is not only
17	a control panel for the electrical power system, its
18	also the space for the main engine console. And its
19	really hard to get a bunch of guys in there with a hose
20	and a whole bunch of people in there that don't know
21	what there're doing —
22	(Tape ended.)
23	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: - and accidentally
24	bump or move or hit a switch and turn on the pumps and
25	i.e. maybe even trip a generator out, that simulation

1	would have to be done under a very controlled
2	environment. I personally as an engineer want five or
3	ten watch deck hands, fire fighters, with CO2
4	canisters, wandering around the inside of my engine
5	room booth, with the possibility of tripping out a
6	generator, and/or causing a problem. Not, I am not
7	saying it wouldn't don't talk about itthis. But to
8	simulate or to practice a fire drill on that board
9	would be hard to do, not impossible, but hard.
10	MS. TERRY WEAVER: Was the presence of the
11	Coast Guard in that space, was that a help or was that
12	a
13	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: Oh, the guys were
14	great. They were awesome, I applaud them kids.
15	MS. TERRY WEAVER: So, that was four
16	additional people in there. There were seven people in
17	that space. Did that
18	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: At that point we have
19	got a problem, I don't care what they touch.
20	MS. TERRY WEAVER: Okay.
21	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: But, in a drill, I do
22	care what they touch in that engine room.
23	MS. TERRY WEAVER: And so since they didn't
24	have a drill in there, if there was, since there was a
25	fire in there, as in this case, were you expected to

. 1	put out a fire that involved the panel, since the other
2	fire fighters hadn't drilled to do that? I mean, if
3	that happened
4	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: I don't understand your
5	question.
6	MS. TERRY WEAVER: Were you expected to do
7	what you did?
8	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: Absolutely.
9	MS. TERRY WEAVER: The three of you in the
10	engine room.
11	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: I don't quite
12	understand your question, but to answer it, was I
13	expected? Was it part of my duties or was it a morale
14	thing, what we did or what?
15	MS. TERRY WEAVER: No, as part of your duties,
16	okay
17	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: Part of my duties is on
18	the E squad.
19	MS. TERRY WEAVER: Okay. Yeah, if you drill
20	in that space and people know if there is a fire you go
21	to the control booth room, since you hadn't, since you
22.	said that it is not realistic to maybe have a drill,
23	you know, in that small space, if something happens
24	down in there
25	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: We talk about it all

1	the time.
2	MS. TERRY WEAVER: Okay.
3	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: Not only just, not only
4	just, not only just during drills, we talk about it
5	constantly. We talk about what ifs, you know, as a
6	matter of fact, even here just recently, we left the
7	shipyard, we had a drill and we will do drills if we
8	are parked at the dock, there is no problem with doing
9	a drill in the control room or in that confined space.
10	And we talked about, okay, if we have a problem here,
11	which breaker do we hit? - If we have a problem here,
12	which breaker do we hit? All non-essential, blah,
13	blah. This type of discussion is carried on in that
14	engine room constantly. I mean, here we are, we are in
15	the middle of the ocean and we are on our own. You
16	just don't drive to the fire department to put these
17	things out. So, yes, we do talk about it constantly.
18	MS. TERRY WEAVER: Could you have used any
19	help from the other fire fighters, could they have
20	helped in any other way?
21	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: No, I don't want
22	somebody, I personally don't want somebody in the
23	engine room that doesn't know what they are doing.
24	That is why to me it is an necessity, it is, if I was
25	writing the requirements, it would be required to even

1	a wiper to go through a fire fighting class. Deck
2	hands don't ever go into an engine room. Rarely,
3	rarely, do the deck officers go into the engine room.
4	They are going in blindly. It is, it is impractical
5	for me to ask a deck officer or a deck hand to go shut
6	off a valve that he has no concept where it is at, and
7	it maybe our life line. And that is why I am getting
8	thereat. It would be like if you were sitting in an
9	airplane, and you are part of the fire fighting team
10	that goes into the cockpit, and the captain tells you
11	to go up there and lower the landing gear, are you
12	going to be able to do it, absolutely not. You can't
13	expect those people who don't go in those spaces,
14	although I do believe and this is in my own mind and I
15	am a firm believer of this, because I am one advocate
16	of safety and fire fighting onboard these ships and I
17	believe that it should be required by the State of
18	Alaska and the captains of each vessel, that the chief
19	mate, the second mate and the third mate make a round
20	in the engine room when they come to work. Find out
21	where the hell they are at. That is a personal
22	opinion.
23	MS. TERRY WEAVER: All right. Did you have any
24	radios, did you have a radio down there?
25	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: No, that was another

1 problem.

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MS. TERRY WEAVER: Okay. How did that

3 present a problem for you?

MR. STANLEY R. JONES: I had no communication The Captain doesn't know who you are with the Captain. in trouble. And he doesn't know who has if we've got a problem. When we lost that control room, we lost the heart of the ship. We lost a hell ofno -a life line, we had no life line. We didn't have a way to throw a life line to the Captain. Everything And thereby, for some reason, I think the control rooms are safe places and in most cases they are. This vessel was one of a few that I know of that have power panels in the space where you have your controls. And this is a perfect example of why they should not be. They should be two separate spaces. You can't put that much power in one room, and try to run and operate the engine in an electrical climate of this vessel, if it goes down in a handbasket and the proof of the pudding is right here today, on the 6th at 12:10. Most of these vessels, the Taku, for instance, the control room is one separate It is all by itself. It has, all it has is controllers in there. Just on and off switches. has no power going into it. And you are talking five hundred volts moving through there and just zipping

1	around like, I mean, it is like putting Kansas in
2	Barstow, California.
3	MR. MIKE JONES: Is there a guy sitting in
4	that room?
5	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: In the control room?
6	MR. MIKE JONES: In that control room?
7	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: That control room,
8	while we are under-way, and in most cases is always
9	manned with either one, two, or three people.
10	MR. MIKE JONES: Are they manned with radios,
11	VHF radios?
12	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: No, there is no need to
13	use them.
14	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: Okay, I am, I think I
15	know where you are going with that, sir.
16	MR. MIKE JONES: Yes.
17	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: No. It is an
18	impractical, and I am not sure the words I am trying to
19	get through here, but I want to make this, those radios
20	should never been in that booth. You have got too
21	much, in my opinion, they have got too much explosive
22	power in that one room. And you have got too much loss
23	of control of this vessel in that one room. The heart
24	of the boat is in that room. And somehow it has to be
25	segregated and these other vessels and you can walk

1	over to the Taku and the all of the electrical panels
.2	are out of that space. So, it is separate space.
3	MR. MIKE JONES: And I am thinking in terms
4	of, when I am thinking of terms of communication and in
5 ·	emergencies.
6	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: In emergencies, in the
7	normal emergency, we have access to sound power phones.
8	We have access to everything else.
9	MR. MIKE JONES: Yes.
10	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: But, those, the VHF
11	radios are just set off to the side until we use them.
12	Usually at docking, or fueling or
13	Mr. JEFFREY HURST: Those radios are, those
14	radios are only used with the engine room for fueling
15	and stuff, because they only have to go up in the
16	engine room, one deck up, but those radios are, a lot
17	of times do not even reach the bridge because there is
18	too much steel. So, whenever anybody, like the
19	watchman or anybody is down below the deck, the car
20	deck, like when they are doing their round down the
21	steward quarters or in the engine room or wherever, a
22	lot of times you can't even get through to the bridge.
23	So, we are talking about these radios, but the radios
24	really don't even work from down below that car deck.
25	MR. MIKE JONES: So

1	Mr. JEFFREY HURST: So, sometimes they do, and
2	sometimes they don't.
3	MR. MIKE JONES: Any suggestions as to how you
4	can keep your communications in case you lose your
5	sound power mikes, such as in this case?
6	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: Yeah, have another
7	sound powered phone other than the one just in your
8	heart.—
9	Mr. JEFFREY HURST: Well, that plus, I think
10	there is such a thing as a repeater that could be
11	mounted somewhere, which I think we, I haven't
12	personally requested one, but I think it has been
13	requested here and there and denied.
L4	Mr. MIKE JONES: I think they had got to have
15	some way to communicate.
16	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: I think they got to
L7	have some way to communicate. I agree with you,
18	sir. And I have looked into the situation where
19	one of my recommendations I made to one of the
20	chief mates. We need at the top of that hatch, I
21	need a general alarm. I need a fire alarm and I
22	need a sound powered telephone, as close to that
23	hatch as I can get, so that I have communications
24	with the captain. You know, one of the thoughts
25	going through my head when I did this, was, how

1	many people are on here, how many people am I
2	responsible for? And what made me the maddest the
3	most, is no access to communications. In that
4	engine room space, in the auxiliary engine space,
5	in the $MSDB$ room, eliminate that, in the auxiliary
6	engine room space, in the main engine space, there
7	is no fire pull. Not one. Not one.
8	MS. TERRY WEAVER: Say that again?
9	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: There is no fire pull.
10	MS. TERRY WEAVER: Ohkay. Not in the engine
11	room, engine space?
12	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: Nowhere in the engine
13	room space on the Motor Vessel Columbia is there a fire
14	pull. In other words, if the chief mate was on the
15	bridge, and I had a fire in the engine room, I could
16	have stepped right outside of the control booth and
17	pulled the fire alarm.
18	MR. MIKE JONES: Is there a fire pull in theat
19	control booth?
20	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: No, sir. But, it would
21	have done us no good in this conditionMr. ?. In this
22	case, if that electrical panel in that booth, we can't
23	think is it in the engine, is it in that booth? We
24	have got to remove it. You, as a sailor, know what I
25	am talking about. You, it has to be in another

1	location. One of two things have to happen here. We
2	have to separate the two, the control room, and that
3	power panel, and/or get some communications outside of
4	that booth to the captain. We were less than an hour
5	away from a major, major problem. We were less than 20
6	minutes away from a major loss of life. At 12:30 that
7	booth would have been filled with the entire engine
8	room staff, waiting on a fire and boat drill. We were
9	just really, really fortunate that it went the way it
LO	went. And we no longer can block engine room hatches
11	with automobiles because of revenue.
12	MS. TERRY WEAVER: Explain that, sir? You
13	mean the engine room escape hatch?
	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: No, the engine room
15	hatches. Approximately one year ago, I made myself
16	known that I don't agree with parking cars next to the
L <b>7</b>	engine room access hatch. And I went through this with
18	several people. I went to a safety meeting, and that
19	yellow pad you see painted down by this engine room is,
20	through my sniveling, and complaining and yelling and
21	screaming, if we get a problem, that is one of the
22	problems with the Alaska Marine Highway, their safety
23	record is bar none some of the best, because they have
24	been damn lucky. Things happen, they do happen and you
5	have to look at the potential of the problem. A lot.

1	and I just, anyway, I made a complaint that you can't
2	get into the engine room with, you can't muster 15, 20
3	people at that engine room hatch to access that fire.
4	That is why that yellow was painted there. This time
5	there was a car parked in that yellow zone. And some
6	of the comments have been made to me, well, we have to
7	have revenue. Well, bite me. I am sorry. Your life
8	means more to me than a \$200.00 car.
9	MR. MIKE JONES: Now, the size of space you
10	are talking about, is about one car?
11	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: It is about one car.
12	MR. MIKE JONES: One car.
13	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: Yes, sir. Life is
14	worth more than that car space to me.
15	MS. TERRY WEAVER: Before we leave the area of
16	fire drills, the Coast Guard observed fire in an
17	abandoned ship drills on May 19, 2000, were you present
18	on a Coast Guard inspection? Coast Guard came onboard?
19	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: May 19th, I was
20	MS. TERRY WEAVER: May 19th. You were?
21	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: I was? No, I wasn't.
22	MS. TERRY WEAVER: Oh, you left
23	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: I had gone. Pardon me.
24	I was home.
25	Mr. JEFFREY HURST: I was present.

	40
1	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: Why did you answer for
2	me?
3	Mr. JEFFREY HURST: I thought you were there.
4	You left that day. The 19th I was off.
5	(Pause.)
6	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: I would have to look at
7	a calendar to make sure.
8	MS. TERRY WEAVER: Okay. The question we
9	really wanted to know, was this, the same fire team
10	that responded to this emergency, were they the same
11	fire team members that participated in this fire drill
12	in May?
13	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: Nine chances out of
14	ten, no.
15	MS. TERRY WEAVER: Partially.
16	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: Partially.
17	MS. TERRY WEAVER: Partially.
18	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: Partially. In order
19	to One or two, because we are a transiet, I use
20	the termurn loosely, we are like on a transiet
21	employee baseds, company.
22	Mr. JEFFREY HURST: That is probably a
23	question you should ask me. And we can look it over
24	MS. TERRY WEAVER: Okay.
25	Mr. JEFFREY HURSTDoug Stern: I mean, if you

1	want actual crew members that were here. There were,
2	Doug Stern, alternate chief mate, a lot of the stewards
3	department was here, because actually I just had a
4	compliment from EDDean, who said, I drilled the crew
5	four days straight, because I knew we had all new
6	equipment, and I knew we had a new station buill to
7	deal with. And since I was new on the ship, I showed
8	up, I showed up on Sunday, we had like a week and a
9	half to get the ship ready for the, we were doing the
10	annual with the Coast Guard, and we had a week and a
11	half before we were on the run. We had all this new
12	equipment, it was just installed. I, myself, hadn't
13	even, I was learning it myself. We hadn't even
14	received the manuals for it at this time. But So, we
15	were just going by, it is, the rescue boat is the same
16	equipment as on the Matanuska, so I knew how to run
17	that one, so we were running that the same way,
18	basically. And we did have, well, the MEC is the same
19	as the Matanuska, anyway I started drilling the crew
20	members on Tuesday, and I was doing drills every day
21	until the Coast Guard showed up Friday afternoon, the
22	day you are talking about, and I wasn't, we only did a
23	whole ship's drill Friday morning. The drills I was
24	doing were isolated drills with the different
25	departments.

1 MR. STANLEY R. JONES: We were going over the 2 equipment.

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Mr. JEFFREY HURSTDoug Stern: We were going over the equipment, and we were practicing, practicing everything we needed to practice. Because everybody was so busy, I couldn't stop the whole ship, I couldn't stop everybody's work, and, but, I was able to get the stewards out there, I brought the stewards up into two groups. We went over all the life saving equipment and the mustering and everything. And I was told just, actually a couple of hours ago, that the drills that we did that week were really helpful in this emergency. There were several of the stewards that were here, actually the chief steward that we talked to the other day, several of the stewards were here because it was, they all got off, they had a week off and they just came to work, a lot of them came to work on that Monday, the people that I had. So, that, I guess that's about all I had, and well one thing I did, I wanted to bring that up, you were talking about drills, I mean, you guys, you can ask me, you can sit me outside and ask, interview me if you want, one thing I did with the stewards was, that was on that training, was I had an expired Co2 bottle, I took them right out here, right behind this dining room, on 200 deck, and

1	we had a little demonstration, we all took turns, not
2	everybody got a chance to shoot the bottle off, but, we
3	showed them how to pull pin and everybody, not
4	everybody, but the majority of them got to squeeze the
5	handle and watch the Co2 come out. So, those are the
6	types of training, because I had to take it in anyway
7	and get it recharged, and weighed. So, that is one
8	type of training that we did that week, which was the
9	week, not the week previous to the incident, but the
10	week previous to that, which was the week that a lot of
11	these people, the stewards and the unlicensed people
12	were onboard They work a week on, and a week off. A
13	lot of us licensed people work two weeks on, and two
14	weeks off.
15	Ms. TERRY WEAVER: Thank you for that
16	clarificationI have a couple of other questions
17	that I would you to elaborate on. When did you finally
18	make communication with someone outside of the engine
19	room?
20	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: The communication was -
21	Ms. TERRY WEAVER: I mean
22	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: By this time the E
23	squad has arrived. The chief mate has arrived and he
24	is trying to assemble some sense of order. I noticed
25	he has <del>d</del> a radio. I believe by this time the chief

1	MR. MIKE JONES: Keyslo.
2	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: Mark Keyslo, yes. He
3	was kind of, he took charge of changing the air bottles
4	from myself, the Chief, and Glen Scott.
5	Ms. TERRY WEAVER: Did anyone tell you all
6	when to come out?
7	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: No.
8	Ms. TERRY WEAVER: Like if you had been in
9	there a certain amount of time?
10	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: No. The three of us
11	are knowledgeable enough with breathing apparatus that
12	we knew when the bells go off we would to go out and
13	vacate the space.
14	Ms. TERRY WEAVER: Okay You mentioned you
15	used a life line. How was that used?
16	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: It was attached to me
17	when we entered the control room. The Chief held onto
18	the life line outside of the control room. Glen Scott
19	grabbed a hold of my pant leg, and away we went.
20	Ms. TERRY WEAVER: I think that is all I have.
21	UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER USCG?: Okay. I was
22	wondering if I could follow up with a couple of items
23	on that yellow square on the car deck. You said that
24	was installed at your recommendation to ?
25	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: Well

1	UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: To give more area for
2	mustering and the fire party
3	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: Yeah, for a number of
4	years now, I advocated that we need space at one side
5	of the engine room hatch. And so, at the safety
6	meetings, I, last year I decided to bring it up, rather
7	than just over a dinner discussion and any other kind
8	of discussion. I decided to get on a piece of paper,
9	on the safety meeting. It was decided in that safety
10	meeting that they would paint this yellow no parking
11	zone designated as a fire lane.
12	UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Okay. And can you
13	account for, since that time, initially did they not
14	park cars there and then they just sort started toof
15	park the cars there all over the time as they became
16	complacenticate about that or can you account whether
17	there was a vehicle here in violation of that zone or -
18	<b>-</b>
19	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: No, I can't account for
20	why.
21	UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: In your experience, so
22	has cars that took to park over that
23	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: In my experience, at
24	least when I am on the boat, I know the Chief Mate
25	really tried to work well with the engine room and they

1	try to work well with me and I know that we try, we
2	really do try to keep the space clear. But, there is
3	always the pressure to put one more car on.
4	MS. TERRY WEAVER: I have one more question in
5	another area. What type of safety equipment do you
6	have in the engine room as far as like life jackets,
7	breathing apparatus, what or have you,? www.hat standard
8	safety equipment do you have?
9	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: The safety equipment
10	down there would be four life jackets kept in the
11	control room, again. There is two self breathe masks
12	in the control room And that would be as far as
13	Ms. TERRY WEAVER: If you had to escape from
14	the engine room in an emergency room, what was
15	available to you to grab would you wear that if you
16	needed to get out of smoke
17	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: Breathe?
18	Ms. TERRY WEAVER: Yes, or something.
19	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: The two rebreathe
20	masks.
21	MS. TERRY WEAVER: Okay. They are smoke hoods?
22	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: _ I don't know.
23	(inaudible)
24	MR. MIKE JONES: You didn't have any smoke
25	hoods?

1 .	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: Oh, we had two. They
2	are a re breather, a canister.
3	MS. TERRY WEAVER: Okay.
4	UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: They are still in
5	there. I took a photograph of them <u>digital</u>
6	pictures it shows the two still on bulkhead there.
7	By Terry Weaver: Okay. That is all I have.
8	Thank you.
9	MR. MIKE JONES: Okay. That is all I have.
10	Thank you. I have one question and I am done. You
11	mentioned before that you were gearing up or
12	preparing for a trainee that was going to come on,
13	on this trip. Or am I mistaken on that?
14	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: Oh, I was, I was
15	informed that we would get a new engineer that hadn't,
16	when I say by a trainee, an unfamiliar individual.
17	MR. MIKE JONES: Okay.
18	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: - A licensed individual
19	that was taking over another ship, that had not been on
20	this vessel before, so, what we do is either take the
21	day third, or the day second, and put him with, on
22	that, with that individual until they are familiar with
23	the watch, and until they are familiar with the
24	equipment, the control board and familiar with how the
25	vessel is operated.

1	MR. MIKE JONES: Okay Would you have had to
2	been, have been with that person?
3	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: Yes.
4	MR. MIKE JONES: And does that person stand a
5	six on and a six off watch?
6	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: Yes, sir.
7	MR. MIKE JONES: So, you would have to make
8	that transition from your 12/12 to the six, is that
9 .	correct?
10	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: Yes.
11	MR. MIKE JONES: And you mentioned to me that
12	you were gearing up
13	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: Not gearing up, but I
14	just <del>, maybe I mis</del>
15	MR. MIKE JONES: Just mentally preparing for
16	that?
17	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: Yes.
18	MR. MIKE JONES: I am trying to, I am trying
19	to understand what that might do to your sleep.
20	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: Nothing.
21	MR. MIKE JONES: Okay. Explain to me.
22	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: I am just, I was
23	mentally preparing because I wanted to make sure that,
24	when I give somebody information, I want to make sure
2.5	it is correct. I don't want them pushing the wrong

1	button.
2	MR. MIKE JONES: Yeah.
3	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: So, that is why I was
4	mentally gearing up for.
5	MR. MIKE JONES: Okay.
6	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: You know, I was, I had
7	anticipated standing a couple of watches, maybe on the
8	way down, I had anticipated on being in some start ups
9	and some shut downs situations.
10	MR. MIKE JONES: Okay.
11	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: Because I am not in the
12	booth all the time, I don't, I don't stay as sharp as I
13	should. So, what I was going to do was just bone tone
14	up a little bit.
15	MR. MIKE JONES: Okay. Thank you.
16	MS. TERRY WEAVER: That is all I have. Thank
17	you very much.
18	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: Thank you.
19	MR. MIKE JONES: End of interview.
20	(Whereupon, the interview concluded.)

1.	engineer had gotten a radio. So, the time frame
2	Ms. TERRY WEAVER: If you don't know the time,
3	that is okay.
4	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: Ten minutes.
5	Ms. TERRY WEAVER: Okay. You can continue
6	with what you were saying. What you are aware of them
7	organizing the fire fighters and what
8	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: They are trying to
9	organize the fire fighting team around this parked
10	automobile, oin that yellow square.
11	Ms. TERRY WEAVER: Okay.
12	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: So, myself, the First
13	and the Chief Engineer, are standing by the control or
14	the engine room hatch, leading into the engine room,
15	which is at, would have been at the forward end of that
16	vehicle, the Chief Mate is on the back quarter left
17	panel of that vehicle, and we are communicating across
18	the top of this vehicle, with everybody trying to get
19	some sense of what to doorder to it.
20	Ms. TERRY WEAVER: Okay. What about the use
21	of breathing apparatus, was there anybody monitoring
22	who was entering this space?
23	MR. STANLEY R. JONES: Yeah, that would have
24	been Mark. You know, that would be, maybe Mark. I don't
25	remember his last name. A Purser, at second purser